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“Law students should be dispensed from the accomplishment of antiquarian
exercises in and about the theory of consideration.”1
INTRODUCTION
A contract, every first-year law student learns, is a promise that will be enforced in a court of law.2 How do we distinguish the casual social promise,3 or
the promise made in jest4, from those behind which we should throw the awesome power of the state? Simple, the law professor responds, we look for “consideration.” To be legally enforceable, a promise must be given in return for a
reciprocal promise or performance. The bargained-for exchange is the touchstone of consideration, and therefore of contract. Elaboration of this concept
requires sorting out subtle distinctions, for example, between a true exchange
and a gift with strings attached.5 What, for example, is the difference between
* Professor, CUNY School of Law. My thanks to Mudassar Topa for excellent research assistance, to the participants at the KCON9 annual conference on contract law, and to Jeremy
Telman and Deborah Zalesne for helpful comments and conversations (which in no way imply endorsement of the views expressed here).
1 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
3 Stood Up for Prom, She Files a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1989, at A12.
4 Compare Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), with Lucy v.
Zehmer, 84 S.E. 2d 516, 518 (Va. Ct. App. 1954).
5 Compare Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff’s traveling to casino was consideration for casino’s promise of a
prize), with Tomczak v. Koochiching Cty. Highway Dep’t, No. C4-98-991, 1999 WL 55501,
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Mr. Story’s legally enforceable promise to his nephew6 and Mrs. Salt’s legally
unenforceable promise to her nephew?7
Once this is accomplished, students will then learn various exceptions: the
half-dozen or more categories of promises where the bargained-for exchange
seems absent, but that will nevertheless be legally enforceable, perhaps because
of reasonable reliance by the promisee,8 the promisor’s moral obligation,9 or
various other reasons.10 The result is several weeks of confusion and needless
study of musty old cases. Worse, generations of present and future lawyers and
judges continue to infect the practice of contract law with the same confusion.
It is not my aim to re-engage the scholarly debate concerning competing
theories of contract.11 Instead, my approach is pragmatic. Consideration doctrine is riddled with exceptions, is largely unhelpful or even counterproductive
in deciding contract disputes and has lost its explanatory power. The time has
come to abandon this fruitless pedagogical exercise once and for all. We should
stop teaching consideration as an element of contract law to new generations of
law students.
This article will present a survey of contemporary case law to demonstrate
the incoherence of, and in some contexts the harm being done by, consideration
doctrine, and to propose a consideration-free contracts syllabus to free us from
this chore. A brief review of the theoretical landscape is followed by a review
of the problems that consideration and its corollaries purport to solve, the different possible rules for each problem and the present state of the law, and a
comprehensive survey of recent court decisions applying and misapplying consideration doctrine and its corollaries. Finally, I propose a consideration-free
syllabus for teaching contracts law.
I.

CONSIDERATION: THE FAILED UNIFIED THEORY OF CONTRACT

More than fifty years ago, Grant Gilmore pronounced the death of classical
theory of contract centered on consideration as its unified theory.12 He pointed
to the growing importance of reliance, restitution, and other competing theories
of promise enforcement, as fundamentally undermining consideration as the
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1999) (holding that homeowner’s release of claims and promise to maintain town equipment was not consideration for town’s promise to lend the equipment), and SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 112 (3d ed. 1957), and see infra text accompanying notes 88–109 (the discussion of mortgage modification cases).
6 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 258–59 (N.Y. 1891).
7 Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94–95 (N.Y. 1919).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
9 Id. § 86 cmt. a.
10 Id. §§ 82–88.
11 See Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915,
917 (2012).
12
GILMORE, supra note 1, at 3.

20 NEV. L.J. 503

506

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

cornerstone of contract.13 Other scholars following Professor Gilmore have taken up the cause. Professor Mark Wessman, for example, argued for abandoning
consideration doctrine convincingly in three articles in 1993,14 1996,15 and
2008.16 The search for a unified theory of contract founded on consideration
has been discredited by a number of other scholars.17 The better view is that
there is no single unifying theory of contract enforcement, and that pluralistic
values necessarily inform court decisions on whether to enforce promises.18
Some, like Professor Randy Barnett, have disputed the idea that reliance, rather
than commercial exchange, is or ought to be, a basis of contract enforcement.19
On the other hand, Professor Charles Knapp surveyed the territory in 1998, and
concluded that reliance retains an important, if not exclusive, role in identifying
promises the law may enforce.20 The Second Restatement implicitly acknowledges the contradiction: a contract requires assent and consideration;21 however, whether or not there is a bargain, a contract may be formed under the special
rules in sections 82–94, under the heading “Contracts without Consideration.”22
Consideration doctrine, as Professor Gilmore pointed out, did not evolve
organically from the common law. Professors Christopher Columbus Langdell
and Samuel Williston and Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes invented it.23 The edifice that law professors erected can and ought to be dismantled when its failure
has become evident. More than forty years have passed since Professor Gilmore announced the death of classical Holmesian consideration. The central
argument in The Death of Contract (that every rule and corollary of consideration doctrine coexists with one or more contrary rules) has lost none of its vitality.24 Still, first-year law students waste precious class time and brainpower
parsing this obscurantism. Consideration remains a tedious centerpiece of the
13

Id. at 70–85.
Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of
Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45, 117 (1993) [hereinafter Wessman, Should We Fire
the Gatekeeper?].
15 Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 713, 845 (1996).
16
Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REV. 9, 10, 53 (2008).
17 BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 161–62 (2012); Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2119
(2014).
18 Kreitner, supra note 11, at 917, 921; Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Plural Values in
Contract Law: Theory and Implementation, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 573, 576
(2019) (citing competing values of efficiency, autonomy, equality and community); Nathan
Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2005).
19 Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 518, 527 (1996).
20 Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191, 1331–32 (1998).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
22 Id. § 17(2).
23 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 20–21.
24
Id. at 33.
14
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law school curriculum. Every year students are taught first that the bargainedfor exchange is the sine qua non for legal enforcement of promises, and then
taught a series of completely inconsistent rules, often in a confusing stew of
common law rule, Restatement (First or Second) rule, U.C.C. rule, majority
rule, and minority rule.
The consideration rules are unnecessary and occasionally harmful. They
are unnecessary when sounder contract principles explain and justify the same
results, and even more so when they are ritualistically incanted in cases not
raising consideration issues at all. They are harmful when they produce unfair
and unsound results, or when courts and lawyers simply misunderstand them so
that they interfere with just and equitable resolution of disputes. As future lawyers and judges, law students should not be confused and biased by learning
abstruse consideration rules riddled with exceptions and contradictions. The
libertarian strain of consideration doctrine, which resists evaluating the fairness
of bargains, subtly gives primacy to one among the many plural and competing
values at the heart of contract disputes. Consideration doctrine, and the courts’
dogged refusal to abandon it, causes confusion, undermines good contract analysis, and subverts the values that should drive the resolution of contract disputes.
Especially troublesome, and arguably indefensible, are the set of corollaries consideration doctrine has spawned.25 Judges continue applying the consideration corollaries to the discrete problems where it does more harm than
good.26 Promises in return for past services or benefits, reaffirmation of discharged promises, contract modifications, illusory promises, third-party guarantees, and binding firm offers are contract problems better dealt with on their
own terms, rather than by continuing to invoke the confusing and unhelpful
language of consideration. For most of these problems the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, adopted in 1981, proposed to abandon consideration or to
establish new rules to deal with the unique values and issues that each discrete
problem poses. Many courts have been reluctant to accept the Second Restatement’s invitations, perhaps because of the indoctrination in consideration that
judges received in their law school contracts class.27
II. THE CORE AND THE COROLLARIES—TACKLING THE ISSUES
The consideration doctrine at its core is about the issue of gift promises,
that is, promises not part of a bargained-for exchange, but consideration has al-

25

Knapp, supra note 20, at 1195; Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper?, supra note
14, at 49.
26 See infra notes 244–67 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 20, at 1192–93; infra notes 36, 58–59, 120–28, 140–41 and
accompanying text.
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so spawned a set of corollaries about a variety of distinct contract problems.28
Each of the corollaries has been, or ought to be, replaced by modern rules more
appropriate to the problem at hand. The corollaries include (1) the pre-existing
duty rule making some post-contract modifications unenforceable; (2) the requirement of payment to enforce binding offers as options; (3) the nonenforceability of promises recognizing past services, moral obligations or discharged debts; (4) the illusory promise doctrine negating contracts that give one
party unrestricted discretion in how to perform, or discretion to cancel or modify promises; and (5) difficulties in enforcing third-party guarantees. For the
core issue of gift promises, and for each of the corollaries, consideration doctrine does a poor job of advancing the competing values at stake, and for each
problem, better doctrinal solutions exist.
A. The Non-Exchange Economy—Charitable Subscriptions, Free Services,
and Gift Promises
1. The Problem and the Values at Stake
The non-profit economy is huge.29 Tax-exempt public charities in the United States have assets of more than $3 trillion, and spend $1.6 trillion each
year.30 Charities of all types rely not only on present gifts from donors but also
on promises of future and structured gifts to plan their activities.31 A wide variety of nonprofit service providers, including free legal aid and health care providers, make promises and commitments on which their clients rely.32 When a
donor (or donor’s estate) reneges on a charitable pledge, or a free service provider dishonors promises to its clients, real and recognizable harm results.33 In
family and business relationships, promises inducing expectations and reliance
may not be based on a bargained-for exchange.34 Whether and when society
and the state should step in to enforce non-exchange promises is the first problem that consideration doctrine fails to solve.
28

See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 935
(1958); B.J. Reiter, Courts, Consideration, and Common Sense, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 439,
441 (1977).
29 Burton A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and Government, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 541, 541–42 (1997).
30 BRICE S. MCKEEVER, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING,
AND VOLUNTEERING 1 (2015).
31 See RONALD R. JORDAN & KATELYN L. QUYNN, PLANNED GIVING: A GUIDE TO
FUNDRAISING AND PHILANTHROPY 6–7(4th ed. 2009).
32 E.g., Lawrence v. Ingham Cty. Health Dep’t Family Planning/Pre-Natal Clinic, 408
N.W.2d 461, 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
33 Maryland Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n of Greater Wash., Inc., 407 A.2d
1130, 1138 (Md. Ct. App. 1979) (denying enforcement of charitable pledge); Lawrence, 408
N.W.2d at 462; Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176–77 (N.Y.
1927) (enforcing charitable pledge).
34 E.g., Conrad v. Fields, No. A06-1387, 2007 WL 2106302, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24,
2007).
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Arguments cited for not enforcing gift promises include the possibility of
fabrication, the greater risk of nondeliberative or improvident promises, the difficulty of determining the promise maker’s seriousness of intention, the possibility that the promise maker’s circumstances will change making enforcement
unfair or oppressive, and the possibility that legal enforcement would discourage some promises from being made.35 There is also the argument that gift
promises are made in the shadow of the law, so that a donee’s reliance on a
non-exchange promise cannot be viewed as reasonable, or at least that the reasonableness of reliance, and the foreseeability of legal enforcement, is hopelessly indeterminate.36
On the other hand, many legal scholars have argued that many or all gift
promises ought to be legally enforced.37 Gift promises may reduce economic
inequality by encouraging transfers from the wealthy to the indigent. Even requiring proof of reliance to enforce gift promises reinforces the economic power of donors, who are generally wealthy, over donees, who tend to be less so.38
Feminists and other scholars have highlighted the important role of household
and caretaking work as well as other intra-family commitments to the functioning of the economy and broader society.39 Ascribing legal power to marketbased exchanges over other promissory commitments leaves out, in gendered
ways, equally important spheres of vital economic activity.40 The problem for
law students and courts is to evaluate the possible rules in light of these competing arguments and values.
2. Choice of Rules
Consideration doctrine is one of several possible rules to distinguish gift
promises that should be legally enforceable from those that should not. The
35

William A. Drennan, Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion, 120 PENN ST. L. REV.
477, 484 (2015); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
CAL. L. REV. 821, 823 (1997); George S. Geis, Gift Promises and the Edge of Contract Law,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 663, 684 (2014).
36 See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275 (1986)
[hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory] (critiquing promissory estoppel and reliance theory
because only “reasonable” or justifiable reliance is rewarded with enforcement, begging the
question of which promises are sufficiently reliable to result in legal enforcement).
37 See Geis, supra note 35, at 688; Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 39, 40 (1992); Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 881, 937 (2007); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred
Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 419–20 (1991); Sabine Tsuruda, Contract, Power, and the
Value of Donative Promises, 69 S.C. L. REV 479, 482 (2017).
38 Tsuruda, supra note 37, at 481–82.
39 See BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE: RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13–14 (Roger
Friedland & A.F. Robinson eds., 1990).
40 See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1251–52
(1999); Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2015) (arguing that commitments of unmarried partners should be contractually enforceable).
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competing possibilities include: (1) require that the donor receive something in
exchange (consideration), (2) require the donee to demonstrate substantial and
reasonable reliance on the promise, (3) require a writing or other formality to
make a promise enforceable, or (4) simply make all gift promises legally enforceable unless the donor has a standard contract law defense, such as incapacity, unconscionability, or impracticability.41 The consideration rule is that a donor’s promise, albeit formal, in writing, witnessed and sealed, is unenforceable
if the donor dies or changes her mind, when the donee or charitable institution
has not provided or promised goods or services of some sort in return.42 Consideration doctrine would also make the nonprofit hospital’s or legal aid office’s promises of free services to its clients unenforceable in most cases.43
The second alternative rule has come to be known as promissory estoppel.
Restatement (Second) section 90 makes promises enforceable when there is a
clear promise made, the promisee has reasonably and foreseeably relied on the
promise, and justice requires enforcement.44 Pennsylvania is apparently the only state to have adopted the third option, namely to grant legal enforcement to
all donative promises made in a formal signed writing.45 Restatement (Second)
section 90(2) adopts the fourth option for charitable pledges, making them enforceable without any additional showing of exchange or reliance.46
The three alternatives to consideration (reliance, the signed writing, and
unrestricted enforcement) can each be adapted to address some of the concerns
motivating the consideration rule. For example, the concern that gift promises
are too easily fabricated is allayed either by requiring a formal writing, or some
heightened standard of proof (including but not limited to evidence of reasonable reliance) that the donor intends to be legally bound.47 Donors who make
rash promises or whose circumstances change may invoke contract law defenses including undue influence, mistake and impracticability.48 The fourth element of promissory estoppel, that “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement,” also gives courts latitude to deny enforcement of gift promises when the
values counseling against enforcement come into play.49

41

See Geis, supra note 35, at 668–72; Kull, supra note 37, at 64–65; Shavell, supra note 37,
at 419–20; Tsuruda, supra note 37, at 482–84.
42 Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 821–22.
43 See Lawrence v. Ingham Cty. Health Dep’t Family Planning/Pre-Natal Clinic, 408
N.W.2d 461, 463–64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (dismissing breach of contract claims by patient
against free health clinic based on absence of consideration).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
45 33 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 2019); see also Geis, supra note 35, at
672.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
47 Drennan, supra note 35, at 519.
48 See, e.g., Love v. Love, 182 B.R. 161, 171 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995) (gift set aside based
on undue influence).
49
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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3. The State of the Law
The exceptions to the consideration rule have led observers to conclude
that a charitable pledge is more likely than not to be enforced in U.S. courts.50
Most state courts are able to discern either a bargained-for exchange51 or some
form of reliance by the charity, such as committing to large expenditures, to enforce the pledge, while a few states justify enforcement as a matter of public
policy to encourage charitable pledges, regardless of reliance.52 A promise of a
future gift of any category may be found legally enforceable because of reasonable and foreseeable reliance,53 or if it is made in recognition of some past benefit conferred by the donee on the donor,54 or in some states, so long as it is
made in writing with or without a seal,55 or was made using an irrevocable trust
or other commitment devices.56
On the other hand, the blanket enforceability rule advocated by Restatement (Second) section 90(2) making all charitable pledges enforceable regardless of reliance or formality has been explicitly adopted in only one state (Iowa).57 An honest appraisal of the state of the law regarding charitable pledges is
that most courts will look for either the bargained-for exchange or reliance by
the charity in planning projects, using the pledge to solicit others, or offering
naming rights or other intangible benefits to the donor.58 On this particular
problem, the Restatement (Second)’s proposed solution, to simply make charitable pledges enforceable subject to ordinary contract defenses, remains an aspiration.
As for gift promises generally, state courts have universally adopted promissory estoppel as an alternative to the bargained-for exchange.59 The West
classification system still treats “promissory estoppel” or “detrimental reliance”
as an equitable rule wholly outside of contracts doctrine.60 During the three
50

Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They Enforceable
and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U. S.F. L. REV. 47, 50 (1992).
51 See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l. Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1927).
52 E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 404 n.105
(2000).
53 Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and Promises Under
Deed: What Our Students Should Know About Enforcement of Promises in a Historical and
International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 108 (2013).
54 See infra Sections II.D.1–3.
55 The Uniform Written Obligations Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 206, 206 (1929).
56 Geis, supra note 35, at 673.
57 CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 234–35
(6th ed. 2007).
58 E.g., Maryland Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n of Greater Wash., Inc., 407
A.2d 1130, 1137 (Md. Ct. App. 1979); see also Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 36, at
275.
59 Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45,
47–48 (1996); see also Knapp, supra note 20, at 1192 (surveying scholarly debate as to
whether case law based on promissory estoppel is truly founded on the reliance interest).
60
West Estoppel Key number 85 Future Events; Promissory Estoppel, WESTLAW, https://
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years between July 2015 and June 2018, there were 127 federal and state court
case headings identified by West as promissory estoppel cases from thirty-five
states and the District of Columbia, all approving (or at least not rejecting) the
rule.61 In thirty-five of those cases, courts enforced a promise based on reasonable reliance.62 Courts have enforced non-exchange promises made by landowners,63 a father’s promise to pay his daughter’s private college tuition,64
promises by mortgagees to modify loan repayment terms,65 and promises made
during the negotiation of commercial contracts.66 Thus, rather than being a deviation from the core of contract doctrine, promissory estoppel, with its elements of foreseeable reliance and the needs of justice, has come into its own as
an alternative test for whether promises should be legally enforced.
The classic gratuitous family promise, on which contracts casebooks and
first-year students spend so much time, is litigated rarely. Among the cases
comprising a three-year case review of consideration keynotes,67 there was only
one case that clearly fits this paradigm, a case where a court rejected a son’s
allegation of a promise to inherit the family ranch because the promise was too
indefinite to enforce, either as contract or based on promissory estoppel.68 The
rules of promissory estoppel were quite adequate to resolve this family dispute,
so even in this most paradigmatic case, consideration doctrine was of little use.
In short, a description of contemporary contract law’s approach to the donative
promise should begin with promissory estoppel and reliance, while also mentioning the options of enforcing all written charitable promises or even all charitable promises. The ill-fitting bargain theory of consideration doctrine deserves
little more than passing historical mention.

1.next.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/KUV9-25PU] (follow “Key Numbers” hyperlink; then
follow “Estoppel” hyperlink and select key number 85).
61 See Appendix II, on file with author (a spreadsheet with the complete list and classification of these 127 cases).
62 See id. (cases coded as promise enforced).
63 Zwart v. Penning, 912 N.W.2d 833, 839 (S.D. 2018); Hayes v. Mountain View Estates
Homeowners Ass’n, 188 A.3d 678, 690 (Vt. 2018).
64 Manfrede v. Harris, 80 N.Y.S.3d 138, 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (enforcing father’s
promise to pay daughter’s private college tuition based on reliance).
65 Ryan-Beedy v. Bank of New York Mellon, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2018);
Traut v. Quantum Servicing Corp., 299 F. Supp. 3d 235, 240 (D. Mass. 2018); Zhong v.
PNC Bank, N.A., 812 S.E.2d 514, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
66 Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 691, 717 (N.D. Ill.
2017).
67 See infra Part III.
68
Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 302 (Wyo. 2016).
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B. The Post-Contract Modification
1. The Problem and the Values at Stake
The first consideration corollary, the pre-existing duty rule, holds that a
mutual agreement to amend contract duties is not supported by consideration,
and therefore unenforceable, when only one party receives additional benefits
or is relieved of some obligations.69 This rule may have arisen from courts’ intuition that no contract party would agree to accept less than originally bargained for, or to pay or perform more, without a quid pro quo, unless the other
party had gained unfair power in the transaction.70 On the other hand, the autonomy values behind a consent theory of contract would counsel that modifications ought to be enforced so long as they are truly voluntary, and that courts
ought to address issues of unfair power directly, for example using the doctrine
of economic duress.71
Consideration doctrine is not especially helpful in resolving post-contract
modification issues. Just as parties may dispute the formation of a contract,
they may dispute the existence or validity of a later agreement to modify the
original contract. Assuming the proponent of the modification can prove mutual assent to a change in terms, the issue becomes whether the courts should enforce the modified terms or the original contract terms. Because legal remedies
for breach may be insufficient and untimely, some one-sided contract modifications may be the result of the “hold-up game,” that is, one party’s threat to
breach unless the other party agrees to increased payment or performance.72
The contract modification problem becomes an enforceability problem, raising
questions of duress and unequal bargaining power, and of the substantive fairness of the modified terms.
Many critics have pointed out that consideration is an unsatisfactory test
for whether mutually agreed modifications should be enforced.73 The pre69

JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.9 (6th ed. 2009).
Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a
Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173, 174 (1984).
71 Id.; Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 429 (1996); cf. Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral
Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 233–34
(1997) (arguing that contract autonomy should include enforcement of agreements not to
modify contracts as economically efficient).
72 Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 338
(1993).
73 See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.22 n.3 (3d ed.
2004) (listing law review articles and case law questioning the rule); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO &
HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (rev. ed. 1995) (“The preexisting duty rule is undergoing a slow erosion and, as a general rule, is destined to be overturned.”); Reiter, supra note 28, at 439–41; Corneill A. Stephens, Abandoning the PreExisting Duty Rule: Eliminating the Unnecessary, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 355, 389 (2008)
70
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existing duty rule can be both over- and underinclusive.74 A modification that is
fully voluntary, and does not reflect any abuse of bargaining power, may still
be denied enforcement because only one party’s rights or obligations change.75
Conversely, a modification that is the product of economic duress may be enforced under the consideration rule, so long as some minimum changes are
made to both parties’ duties.76
The common law draws a clear line between parties’ duties before and after making a contract. Pre-contract, parties bargain at “arm’s length,” each concerned only with their own self-interest, and therefore owing no duty to bargain
in good faith or any other duty, other than not to engage in fraud. After making
a contract, each party owes the other party “a duty of good faith.”77 That duty is
often described as including the duty not to deprive the other party of the expected benefit of the bargain.78 When unanticipated problems arise, it is entirely consistent with good faith that parties may renegotiate their mutual obligations, or the obligations of only one party.79 Conversely, both parties should
refrain from exploiting the other party’s vulnerability that results from the contract itself, in other words, the difficulty of obtaining a substitute counterparty
when projects are underway, to extract favorable changes or concessions in
contract promises.80 Thus, the real issues in evaluating contract modifications
revolve around good faith and economic duress, and not whether there is a new
bargained-for exchange. Nevertheless, courts have adhered stubbornly to the
consideration requirement for post-contract modifications, sometimes with regrettable results.81
Consideration analysis can lead to unjust results in some applications to atwill employment contracts. Courts often struggle with the problem that in a true
at-will employment contract, either party may cease performance at any time,
subject only to the employer’s duty to pay for work previously performed.82 As
a result, an employer’s promise of additional compensation or benefits after

(labeling preexisting-duty rule as unnecessary in view of modern contract doctrines such as
duress).
74 Johnston, supra note 72, at 375.
75 E.g., Barrett-O’Neill v. Lalo, LLC, 171 F. Supp. 3d 725, 744 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (denying
enforcement of modification agreed at the request of elderly consumer, but also finding the
merchant’s performance unconscionable under state consumer protection law).
76 See Stephens, supra note 73, at 364.
77 Market St. Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 1991);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
78 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 369, 379–80 (1980).
79 See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
80 U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
81 See infra text accompanying notes 89–112.
82
Jimenez v. Cintas Corp., 475 S.W.3d 679, 684–85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).

20 NEV. L.J. 503

Spring 2020]

STOP TEACHING CONSIDERATION

515

work was performed,83 or an employee’s post-employment promise not to
compete or to preserve confidentiality,84 appears to be unsupported by any new
consideration. In reality, these are post-contract modification cases, where
courts should apply principles of economic duress, public policy, and unconscionability. Instead, courts must go through doctrinal gymnastics to enforce
reasonable changes to relational employment contracts, or instead arbitrarily
refuse to enforce reasonable changes.
The mortgage foreclosure crisis that began in 2008 gave new relevance to
the post-contract modification problem. As a result of the unanticipated nationwide 30 percent decline in home values, and the very high loan-to-value
ratios of many pre-crisis mortgage loans, foreclosures reached unprecedented
levels.85 At the same time, mortgage lenders and investors faced unprecedented
losses on foreclosure sales, and thus had a real economic incentive to renegotiate the loan terms with homeowners.86 Investors and eventually the federal
government encouraged mortgage servicers to extend payment due dates, temporarily accept reduced interest rates, and even reduce principal balances, when
such modifications could produce a better recovery than a foreclosure sale.87 It
could not be said that the beneficiaries of these modifications, the delinquent
homeowners, had unfair leverage or bargaining power over the banks and giant
financial institutions agreeing to modify their loan terms. Public policy strongly
favored these contract modifications where homeowners had the ability to repay more of their debt than banks could recover in depressed market foreclosure sales.
The federal government intervened in 2009 with the voluntary Home Affordable Modification Program, which provided taxpayer-funded incentive
payments to mortgage servicers to encourage modifications.88 HAMP prescribed eligibility, application procedures, and terms for mortgage modifications.89 The key economic test for these modifications was that they be net present value positive; that is, that the likely repayment by the homeowner, after
rescheduling payments and reduction of interest or principal, would yield a

83

See Boswell v. Panera Bread Co., 879 F.3d 296, 302 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding employer’s
offer of a bonus based on performance enforceable using unilateral contract analysis).
84 See Allied Waste Servs. of N. Am., LLC v. Tibble, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107, 1109
(N.D. Ill. 2016).
85 Vicki Been et al., Decoding the Foreclosure Crisis: Causes, Responses, and Consequences, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 388, 388–90 (2011).
86 See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2009).
87 Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727,
732 (2010).
88 Id. at 729.
89
Id. at 749–52.
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greater present value than a foreclosure sale of the property.90 The HAMP program, which served as a template for most mortgage modifications during the
period, called for the mortgage servicer and borrower to enter first into a temporary modification agreement, whose terms promised a permanent modification if the borrower met all the performance conditions of the temporary modification.91 Between 2009 and 2016, more than six million mortgage loans were
modified, including roughly two million HAMP modifications.92
Many homeowners who signed temporary modification agreements and believed they had met the conditions to the servicers’ promise of a permanent
modification had difficulty obtaining the permanent modifications they had
been promised.93 Others who signed permanent modifications were told by servicers that their permanent modifications had been canceled or revoked. Litigation,94 including class actions,95 ensued.
Mortgage servicers raised two arguments to defend their refusal or cancellation of permanent modifications. First, they argued that homeowners had not
met all the conditions precedent in the temporary modification agreements.96
Those issues were largely factual. Second, servicers argued the pre-existing duty rule: they argued that mortgage modification agreements, temporary or permanent, lacked consideration.97 The servicer and investor were agreeing to accept less interest, less principal, or at least later repayment, than the original
mortgage note called for, without any quid pro quo from the homeowner.98
Homeowners responded by pointing out that the HAMP temporary modification agreements required them to submit updated financial information, open
tax and insurance escrow accounts in some cases, and to consent to credit

90

Steve Holden et al., The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance, 40
REAL EST. ECON. S32, S33–34 (2012).
91 Braucher, supra note 87, at 752–53.
92 Making Home Affordable, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initia
tives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
8WPL-LSWV] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
93 Braucher, supra note 87, at 754–56, 760; Jonathan A. Marcantel, Enforcing the Home Affordable Modification Program, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121, 126 (2014).
94 Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) (assuming consideration required to enforce modification and finding there was consideration for a TPP in borrower’s promise to provide information); Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., B243614,
2014 WL 334222, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014) (same); Palacio v. HSBC Bank
U.S.A., N.A., No. 10-01937, 2012 WL 4928878, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding HAMP TPP not enforceable because it lacked consideration); Anilus v. OneWest Bank,
FSB, No. NOCV201001774, 2011 WL 2735052, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 03, 2011);
Tammy J. Raduege, Enforceability of Trial Period Plans (TPP) Under the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 331 (2014).
95 E.g., Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013); Senter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
96 E.g., Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882.
97 E.g., Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011).
98
Id. at 347–48.
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checks, all forms of “legal detriment” that amounted to consideration for the
amended loan terms.99
Courts divided over whether the requirements imposed on homeowners by
the HAMP program were inducements for the modification, or simply conditions on the mortgage servicers’ essentially gratuitous promise to reduce their
payments.100 In order to obtain permanent modifications, homeowners were required to submit financial information, including verification of income and assets, to open new escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, and to participate in
credit counseling.101 Courts finding no consideration implicitly or explicitly
held that these steps were akin to conditions for receiving a gift, rather than inducements for the servicers’ promise to reduce or recast payments.102
Oddly, few if any courts deciding these mortgage modification cases referred to the Restatement (Second) section 89 approach, permitting enforcement of a modification based on changed circumstances.103 The 2008 real estate
crash and the nationwide decline in home values was widely regarded as unforeseen.104 Certainly there was no historical precedent for a circumstance in
which millions of homeowners had mortgage debt exceeding their home value,
making it impossible to sell.105 The typical post-crisis mortgage modification
agreement would seem to fit squarely within section 89(a), as a modification
that is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties
when the contract was made. The failure of courts deciding the mortgage modification cases to consider the Restatement rule is regrettable.
Promissory estoppel claims by mortgage borrowers attempting to enforce
modification agreements were met with similarly inconsistent results.106 Ulti-

99

Id. at 352 (finding consideration because homeowners agreed to provide financial information in return for modified payments).
100 Compare id. (finding consideration), and Healey v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 11 CV 3340,
2012 WL 994564, at *10 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 20, 2012) (same), with Senter, 810 F. Supp.
2d at 1348 (finding no consideration).
101 Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 673 F.3d 547, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Illinois
law); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348, 352 (D. Mass. 2011).
102 Senter, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.
103 See, e.g., id. at 1339.
104 Bruce Bartlett, Who Saw the Housing Bubble Coming?, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2009), https
://www.forbes.com/2008/12/31/housing-bubble-crash-oped-cx_bb_0102bartlett.html#63e
2cfec5a43 [https://perma.cc/8EXR-JMGV]; The Unofficial List of Pundits/Experts Who
Were Wrong on the Housing Bubble, ECON. CONTEMPT (July 16, 2008, 1:15 PM),
http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2008/07/official-list-of-punditsexperts-who.html
[https://perma.cc/Z85A-2RPB].
105 E. RAY CANTERBERY, THE GLOBAL GREAT RECESSION 164–65 (2011).
106 Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (finding no reliance); Zhong v. PNC Bank, N.A., 812 S.E.2d 514, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that
homeowner sufficiently alleged elements of promissory estoppel); Sparra v. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Tr. Co., 785 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (finding alleged promise too indefinite); Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 785 S.E.2d 8, 20–21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (finding
homeowner adequately alleged detrimental reliance on servicer’s promise to modify mort-
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mately it appeared that the broad issues raised, potentially involving thousands
if not millions of homeowners, were resolved piecemeal when class certification motions were denied in various cases.107
The values motivating the pre-existing duty rule were not advanced by
denying enforcement of these mortgage debt modifications. First, it is hard to
see how homeowners facing foreclosure could be engaging in a hold-up game
against the financial behemoths servicing their mortgage loans; the bargaining
power was clearly on the side of the banks.108 It was the homeowners, not the
banks, who were facing severe economic duress. Second, the modified contracts were in no way unfair to the mortgage investors. The whole point of
HAMP modifications was to yield a greater net return to investors from the
modified loan than would result from a foreclosure sale. There was thus ample
“benefit to the promisee,” given the dramatic changes in the housing market.109
Finally, the quid pro quo requirement for modifications does not allow for any
consideration of public policy, that is, the effect the contract modifications
would have on other parties. Mortgage loan modifications were motivated not
only by solicitude for the plight of homeowners in foreclosure, but also to prevent further deterioration of the general housing market caused by the glut of
distressed foreclosure sales. The foreclosure crisis mortgage modification cases
illustrate how poorly consideration doctrine advances the values of contract
law.
2. Choice of Rules
Article 2 of the U.C.C. has abandoned the pre-existing duty rule. Section 2209 of the U.C.C. explicitly abrogates the consideration requirement to enforce
contract modifications for sales of goods.110 The Official Comment notes that
the duty of good faith permits courts to police abusive modifications extorted
without commercial justification.111 The Restatement (Second), while incorporating the pre-existing duty rule in section 73, separately provides in section 89
that modifications are binding if the modified promises are “fair and equitable
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made,” or “to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of [a] material change of position in reliance on the [modified] promise,” or as provided by

gage loan); Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. N.A., 373 P.3d 189, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (finding alleged promise to modify too indefinite).
107 E.g., Memorandum of Decision at 31, In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., MDL No. 10-2193 RWZ (D. Mass. 2013) (order denying
class certification).
108 NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE
RESCUING WALL STREET 148–49 (2012).
109 Id. at 157.
110 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
111
Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2.
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statute, for example, U.C.C. section 2-209.112 Thus, the three prominent alternatives to the pre-existing duty rule are the U.C.C.’s full enforcement of agreed
modifications, subject to scrutiny for good faith and duress, enforcement based
on estoppel and reliance, and the Restatement’s change in circumstances test.
3. The State of the Law
While all fifty states have adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C. in whole or in
part, including section 2-209, Restatement (Second) section 89 has been less
widely adopted.113 In Professor Magg’s survey published in 1998, he found
twenty-one cases citing section 89 seemingly with approval, and only one expressing a negative view.114 On closer examination, since the Restatement
(Second)’s final adoption in 1981, only seven state courts have expressly
adopted section 89.115 At least three state courts have expressly declined to
adopt the Restatement and have reaffirmed the pre-existing duty rule.116 Several courts have made a passing nod to section 89 without going so far as to expressly adopt it.117 California, New York, Michigan, and South Dakota have
abrogated the pre-existing duty rule by statute, at least for written modifications
of written contracts,118 and Alabama, Minnesota, and Nebraska courts have
112

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See sources cited infra notes 114 and 115.
114 Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 522 (1998).
115 New Eng. Rock Servs. v. Empire Paving, Inc., 731 A.2d 784, 789 (Conn. Ct. App. 1999);
Nooney Krombach Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 929 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) (citing § 89 “we do not believe that the court was obliged to deny enforcement of the
defendant’s promise, made to induce reliance on the part of the plaintiff, because of any absence of consideration.”); Gintzler v. Melnick, 364 A.2d 637, 640 (N.H. 1976); Smaldino v.
Larsick, 630 N.E.2d 408, 412–13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630,
636 (R.I. 1974); Guesthouse Int’l, LLC v. Shoney’s N. Am. Corp., 330 S.W.3d 166, 192
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (adopting § 89 but also finding consideration for the modification);
Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 240 (Wyo. 2000).
116 Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC v. Honeoye Lake Acquisition, LLC, C.A. No. CV
9742-VCL, 2015 WL 6455367, at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2015), reargument granted in part,
No. 9742-VCL, 2015 WL 7302187 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2015), and judgment entered, No.
9742-VCL, 2016 WL 297808 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 151
A.3d 450 (Del. 2016) (assuming the traditional rule continues to govern under Delaware
law); Margeson v. Artis, 776 N.W.2d 652, 657 n.5 (Iowa 2009); Zhang v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 103 P.3d 20, 23 (Nev. 2004).
117 Greenberg v. Mallick Mgmt., Inc., 527 N.E.2d 943, 948–49 (III. App. Ct. 1998) (discussing preexisting duty rule, U.C.C. and section 89 at length, concluding that whether to adopt
modern rule is “not for this court to say” and finding consideration present); Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v. Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016);
Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 380 P.3d 1260, 1272 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (citing but
not explicitly adopting § 89 and finding the modification too indefinite to enforce) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part 404 P.3d 464, 479 (Wash. 2017) (finding genuine issue of fact whether
definite modification was offered without discussing consideration or § 89).
118 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (West 2019) (retains the consideration requirement for oral modifications); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566.1 (2019); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney
113
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held that consideration is not necessary to enforce modifications, without referring to the Restatement.119 On the other hand, a surprising number of courts in
many other states continue to invoke the pre-existing duty rule, without reference to section 89, U.C.C. section 2-209, or any criticism of the rule.120 A
number of states have expressed uncertainty or have conflicting appellate decisions.121
The pre-existing duty rule has little to recommend as a tool to resolve issues around enforcement of contract modifications that are largely issues of
economic duress and good faith.122 While contracts law teachers must recognize the persistence of the old consideration-based rule, a full discussion of the
topic ought to make the clear distinction between initial contract formation and
contract modifications, and to normalize the modern approach. It is past time to
relegate the pre-existing duty rule to its true place as a regrettably persistent
vestige.

2019); Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 517 (S.D. 1996) (citations
omitted).
119 Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 640–41 (Ala. 2003); Brooksbank v. Anderson, 586 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 720
N.W.2d 886, 896 (Neb. 2006).
120 Worden v. Crow, 427 S.W.3d 143, 147 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999
P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000); Rinck v. Ass’n of Reserve City Bankers, 676 A.2d 12, 17 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1996); Davidpur v. Counne, 972 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Carroll v.
Bd. of Regents, 751 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. N.W.
Pipeline Corp., 979 P.2d 627, 639 (Idaho 1999); AM Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436,
443 (Ind. 2015); Augusta Med. Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc., 608 P.2d 890,
894 (Kan. 1980); Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Bureau of
Purchases, 691 A.2d 190, 194 (Me. 1997); Palacio v. HSBC USA, N.A., No. 10-01937, 2012
WL 4928878, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012); Iuka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So. 2d
1367, 1372 (Miss. 1995); Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 23, 27 (N.C.
1984); Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 756 S.E.2d 84, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d on other
grounds, 776 S.E.2d 832, 836 (N.C. 2015); James v. Clackamas Cty., 299 P.3d 526, 533 (Or.
2013); Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. 2016) (“A contract,
either oral or written, may be modified by a subsequent agreement which is supported by
legally sufficient consideration, or a substitute therefor, and meets the requirements for contract formation.”); Cardinal Dev. Co. v. Stanley Const. Co., Inc., 497 S.E.2d 847, 851 (Va.
1998).
121 Compare Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 9742-VCL, 2015 WL 6455367,
at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2015) (noting section 89 but assuming consideration still required
under Delaware law for modification), with Camden Fitness, LLC v. Wandless Enters., Inc.,
No. C.A. CPU5-12-000295, 2013 WL 8854873, at *2–3 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 11, 2013)
(citing and applying section 89); cf. e.g., Greenberg, 527 N.E.2d at 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988),
app. denied, 535 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1988) (discussing section 89 and U.C.C. § 2-209 in a
mixed contract, and declining to adopt section 89 by finding consideration).
122
Stephens, supra note 73, at 357.
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C. The Firm Offer or Option Contract
1. The Problem and Competing Values
The unenforceability of firm offers is another problematic corollary of consideration doctrine. One who proposes a contract offer may freely withdraw the
offer at any time before it has been accepted.123 In a variety of contexts, the offeree might wish for the offeror to agree not to exercise that power of withdrawal for a fixed time period, so that the offeree might engage in due diligence, line up related contracts, or obtain financing.124 When the offeror
promises not to withdraw the offer for a period of time, the promise is an option
if the offeree pays for the promise, and is otherwise known as a firm offer.125
While it is true that the promise not to withdraw a binding offer is a species of
promise, it almost invariably arises in a commercial context where parties
probably expect legal enforceability.126
The values that would support a rule permitting an offer to be revoked, despite a promise not to, are obscure. Yet that is the result of the binding offer
corollary to consideration doctrine. While the idea that the offeror is “master of
the offer” may advance basic notions of autonomy and freedom of contract,
holding the offeror to a promise not to revoke an offer seems entirely consistent
with offeror autonomy. Moreover, in a business environment such as commercial real estate, or large construction projects, parties often must rely on the durability of contract offers in order to negotiate other related contracts. For example, the real estate buyer relies on loan and title insurance commitments in
order to proceed with a purchase. The general contractor relies on bids by subcontractors to price its main contract offer. Even in the absence of reliance in
the sense of a change in position, there is no obvious reason an offeror should
not be free to make an offer irrevocable for a reasonable time.
2. Choice of Rules
A corollary to the consideration doctrine makes firm offers legally unenforceable. The corollary is that that a promise not to withdraw an offer, no matter how formally made, is a separate promise, and is not enforceable, unless the
offeree has paid money or otherwise exchanged value for the promise, in other
words, purchased an option.127 In contrast, the rule adopted in the Restatement
(Second) is to enforce any firm offer that is in a signed writing and “recites a

123

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 22 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 282–91 (2004).
125 Id. at 279.
126 Id. at 291.
127 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933); Eisenberg supra
note 124, at 281 (contending that the common law rule is the product of indefensible formal
legal reasoning).
124
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purported consideration.”128 For sales of goods, the U.C.C. Article Two makes
binding any firm offer made by a merchant in writing.129 Various state statutes
also make written binding offers enforceable without proof of actual consideration.130 Even offers that are not expressly made irrevocable for a period of time
may be treated as binding when the offeree reasonably and foreseeably relies
on the offer, as in the case of a general contractor who uses a subcontractor’s
bid to price a general contract bid.131 Professor Eisenberg has advocated going
further by removing the remaining obstacles (the signed writing, the recital of
consideration) and making all promises not to withdraw or revoke an offer
binding.132
3. The State of the Law
The U.C.C. is of course the law in all fifty states. Consideration is thus irrelevant in deciding whether to enforce binding offers for sales of goods. As for
contracts outside of Article Two, state courts appear to remain divided. Some
courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) section 87(1) and accept a simple written recital of consideration, to support a firm offer.133 However, the majority of state courts continue to apply the rule that separate consideration is required to support an option contract.134 Opinions applying the consideration
rule rarely if ever offer any values promoted by the rule, and in some cases
even cite Restatement (Second) section 87 without explaining why they are not
following it.135
The reliance prong of the Restatement section 87 rule seems to have gained
broader acceptance.136 For example, the Iowa Supreme Court recently held that
128

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 87(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
130 E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 2019).
131 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 87(2).
132 Eisenberg, supra note 124, at 288–89.
133 Knott v. Racicot, 812 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Mass. 2004); 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154
S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004); see also Smith v. Wheeler, 210 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga. 1974)
(enforcing an option reciting a one dollar nominal consideration).
134 Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. KFX, Inc., 153 F.3d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying
Missouri law); Polk v. BHRGU Avon Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 835–36 (Idaho 1980) (explicitly rejecting the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1) and holding that a written option agreement that
contains a fictional recital of a nominal consideration is unenforceable for lack of consideration); see also Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 793 (Kan. 1977) (same); Country Club
Oil Co. v. Lee, 58 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. 1953); McLellan v. Charly, 758 N.W.2d 94, 101
(Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Foy v. Foy, 484 So. 2d 439, 442–43 (Ala.1986)).
135 Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122; Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Spelman, No. 63164, 1992 WL
390216, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
136 Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179–81 (Mass. 1978);
Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Expl. Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996); e.g., Pavel Enters. v.
A.S. Johnson Co., Inc., 674 A.2d 521, 529 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
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an oral option for the sale of a farm to a tenant could be enforced based on
promissory estoppel, in the absence of either a writing or consideration.137 It is
therefore difficult to synthesize a rule for law students to accurately describe
the state of the law regarding binding offers. The best appraisal may be this:
that there is a modern approach upholding offers expressing an intent not to
withdraw with requisite written formality; that an offer may be found irrevocable because of reasonable and foreseeable pre-acceptance reliance; but that
many states cling to an older rule limiting binding offers to those supported by
a separate payment or exchange.
D. Discharged Past Debts and Promises Recognizing Past Benefits
1. The Problem
Consideration doctrine can also be an obstacle to enforcing promises to reaffirm past debts or honor moral obligations. One example is an employer’s
promise of payments in recognition of past services that had been rendered gratuitously.138 These promises often advance equity values when a wealthy promisor recognizes past failure to compensate a less wealthy promisee. On the other hand, enforcing a distressed debtor’s promise to reaffirm a debt discharged
in bankruptcy or by the statute of limitations may further impoverish an indigent worker. For that reason, the Bankruptcy Code requires attorney or court
review of any agreement to reaffirm a discharged debt principally to guard
against economic duress.139
In a relational contract setting, parties working together on numerous
commercial projects may at some point feel that a prior contract has been
breached, and agree to wipe the slate clean, as it were, in exchange for a new
promise.140 In these cases, admittedly, it seems less clear that enforcement advances justice by protecting reliance by the promisee, although certainly reliance may result from these revived promises. In many cases, however, courts
and parties may feel that a promise to pay for past services really reflects the

137

Kunde v. Estate of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 805, 812 (Iowa 2018).
Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017) (holding that a father’s promise
to compensate his son for past services and injuries was unenforceable for lack of consideration, without reference to the Second Restatement § 86).
139 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(I) (2018); see also Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White,
Debt after Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 715
(1999).
140 Loper v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 203 So. 3d 898, 904–05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding contractor’s post-contract promise to replace windows and extend warranty was
enforceable because homeowner’s agreement not to sue for defective work was valid consideration); c.f. Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding promise to pay broker commission on expired listing agreement unenforceable,
mostly to effectuate statutory restriction on broker override clauses, essentially on grounds
of public policy, although broker might have argued resolution of bona fide dispute).
138
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resolution of what would otherwise be a restitution claim (hence the occasional
use of the phrase “promissory restitution”).141
An interesting case illustrating the unhelpfulness of consideration doctrine
involved a seemingly one-sided (and badly written) letter agreement between a
lawyer and his client.142 In the letter agreement, the lawyer referred to unpaid
legal bills owed to his firm (and not him personally) as well as a “50-50 partnership” that “[a]t least one of us had in mind . . . .”143 These recitals were followed by the client’s promise to pay $25,000 monthly towards the legal bills,
$500,000 with interest, and 5 percent of the gross receipts of a real estate development.144 Viewed in the light most favorable to the attorney, he and his client had apparently worked on several commercial real estate projects, the attorney believed he had a bona fide claim to a partnership share that the client had
promised but never delivered, and this letter agreement was a bona fide resolution of his claims.145
The court rejected the plaintiff attorney’s argument that the client’s promises were in return for settlement of past disputes, because the letter did not include any release of claims, or promise not to sue, by the attorney.146 The court
spent a considerable part of its analysis on the New York statute that makes
promises to pay for past services rendered enforceable if the promise is in writing and recites the “past consideration.”147 Dividing the letter agreement into
three separate promises by the client, the court found that only the agreement to
pay past legal bills to the attorney’s firm sufficiently recited the “past consideration.”148 The second and third promises to pay $500,000 and a percentage of
future receipts to the lawyer were not supported by any written recital describing the past services for which this money was to be paid, and the vague reference to a “50-50 partnership” was held not to be sufficient description of past
consideration.149
One suspects that the heart of the matter here was an attorney overreaching
in a contract with someone who was both a client and a business partner. The
court makes no mention of the attorney’s fiduciary duty, or of the rules of professional conduct governing the establishment and collection of attorney fees,
but one suspects the skepticism with which the court viewed this contract
stemmed in part from the fact that an attorney was exacting generous terms
from a former client. Had the two parties both been real estate investors, the
141

See Stanley D. Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1971).
142 Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 500–01.
146 Id. at 503–04.
147 Id. at 502–03.
148 Id. at 503.
149
Id. at 503–04.
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court might have overlooked the informality of the letter and simply invoked
the principle that courts will not look behind a voluntary bargain. Applying either unconscionability or undue influence doctrine would have permitted the
court to examine why the client agreed to this arrangement, rather than applying formalistic rules in a search for consideration, past or present.
2. Choice of Rules
The traditional consideration rule is that a promise made in recognition of
past services not rendered in exchange for the promise, or a promise to reaffirm
a discharged debt, would be unenforceable.150 A promise that appears to reaffirm a discharged or unenforceable debt may, however, be supported by valid
consideration if the past debt may be characterized as disputed, rather than unenforceable, so that the new promise is in settlement of a bona fide dispute.151
Similarly, the promise to reward past services given gratuitously could be recast as a resolution of a potential restitution claim, assuming the promisee
agrees to accept the new promise in lieu of restitution. On the other hand, the
Restatement (Second) dispenses with consideration in both instances.152 It
makes promises to reaffirm discharged debts enforceable despite the absence of
a new exchange153 and makes promises in recognition of past benefits or services enforceable without consideration “to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.”154 The Restatement section 86 principle permitting enforcement of
promises recognizing past benefits extends only to past benefits or services
originally provided gratuitously. If the new promise is one to make additional
payments for services that were the subject of a prior contract, it is not enforceable, even if the promisor is recognizing the inadequacy or injustice of the prior
contract.155 A promise to make such a bonus payment might in some cases be
characterized as a modification, if the contract is still executory, enforceable
based on an unexpected change in circumstances.156
3. The State of the Law
Cases raising these issues are infrequent, giving rise to the question whether they need to be covered in an introductory contracts law course at all. Only
thirteen cases from eleven state and federal courts and the federal court of
claims even cite section 86.157 Of those, only four adopt section 86 or at least
150

PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 5.2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
152 Id. §§ 82–94.
153 Id. §§ 82–85.
154 Id. § 86.
155 Id. § 86 cmt. f.
156 See supra text accompanying note 103.
157 Jennings v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 764, 771 (Fed. Cl. 2016); First Nat’l Bankshares
of Beloit, Inc. v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344, 1357 (D. Kan. 1994); In re Nat’l Audit Def.
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cite it approvingly.158 The Tennessee Supreme Court held explicitly that “past
consideration” will never support promise enforcement, in a case where the dissent cited section 86.159 Even among the cases in the three-year survey of consideration headnotes, only six cases not referencing the Restatement could be
said to raise “past consideration” issues.160 New York and California have essentially codified section 86 by statute.161 However, treatises continue to refer
to section 86 as a minority rule.162 These rare cases still have value as illustrations to help students differentiate bargained-for exchange theory from reliance
and restitution as alternative bases to enforce promises. Given that they often
arise in family contexts,163 the cases also offer an occasion to discuss feminist
and other critical perspectives on contract law and theory.
E. The “Illusory Promise” and the Very One-Sided Deal
1. The Problem and Competing Values
If a contract gives one party the discretionary authority to cancel the contract, to determine what goods or services it will provide or purchase, or to
change any or all terms at will, is it a contract at all? The illusory promise doctrine makes the other party’s promises unenforceable if one party’s duties are
truly optional, for want of a true exchange.164 The problem of one-sided discretion in most cases is not so much about whether a contract has been formed, but
rather whether through an abuse of bargaining power or otherwise, one party
Network, 332 B.R. 896, 920 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005); Edelson v. Cheung, No. 13-5870 (JLL),
2015 WL 5316651, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2015); Starr v. Katz, No. 91-3365, 1994 WL
548209, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1994); Realty Assoc. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121,
1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Knight v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 273 Cal.
Rptr. 120, 145 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Ketterle v. Ketterle, 814 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Mass.
Ct. App. 2004); McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619, 623 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Salas v. Mafnas, No. 2008-SCC-0037-CIV, 2010 WL 2332075, at *15 n.11 (N. Mar. I. June
8, 2010); Meadows v. Langlais Constr. Co., No. C.A. 80-2966, 1984 WL 560340, at *2 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 1984); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tenn. 2004); Dulany Foods, Inc.
v. Ayers, 260 S.E.2d 196, 203 (Va. 1979) (Poff, J., dissenting).
158 Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344 at 1357; Realty Assoc., 738 P.2d at 1125; McMurry, 849
S.W.2d at 622–23; Meadows, 1984 WL 560340, at *3.
159 Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 600, 607.
160 Stemcells, Inc. v. Neuralstem, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 623, 637–38 (D. Md. 2015); Watkins
v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017); Chandra v. Chandra, 53 N.E.3d 186, 191 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016); Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. Ct. App.
2015); Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Nicholas v. Hofmann,
158 A.3d 675, 687 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
161 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1606 (West 2019); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1105 (McKinney
2019).
162 PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 5.4.
163 See, e.g., Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 595 (postnuptial agreement); see also Chandra, 53
N.E.3d at 186.
164 Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 426–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 77 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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has secured an unfairly one-sided deal. Courts and scholars attached to the bargain theory of contract have rescued seemingly illusory contracts using interpretation devices, for example the duty of good faith famously invoked by
Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, to cabin the apparent unfettered discretion.165
Professor Eisenberg argues sensibly that a contract in which one party makes
truly nonbinding promises may reflect sensible business judgments, and that
when they are the product of deception or unfair bargaining, unconscionability
and other defenses can handle the problem.166
This problem arises frequently in two categories of contemporary cases:
the at-will employment contract and mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts. In an at-will employment contract, the employee is free to quit, and
the employer free to fire the employee, at any time.167 Courts have struggled
with the question whether an at-will employment contract contains any meaningful promises exchanged for an employee’s promise not to compete.168 Consumers have also challenged a variety of standardized form contracts that permit a merchant to change terms or opt out of promises essentially at will.169
2. Choice of Rules
Traditional consideration doctrine on the one hand denies enforcement to a
party making only illusory promises, but on the other hand finds a variety of
stratagems to avoid holding a promise truly illusory.170 The duty of good faith
may be called upon to constrain the party’s apparently unfettered discretion, as
in the case of exclusive dealings or requirements contracts.171 If the party with
discretion must provide any advance notice before withdrawing from the contract, that promise is usually found sufficient to overcome the illusory promise

165

Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (N.Y. 1917).
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 649–
52 (1982).
167 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV.
427, 433 (2016).
168 Id. at 442–43.
169 See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1649–51 n.93, 98, 103–04 (2005). Compare Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F.
Supp. 3d 1051, 1057–58, 1064–66, 1071, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom., 709 F.
App’x 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding credit card agreement not illusory despite change-interms provision by invoking duty of good faith), with Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc.,
669 F.3d 202, 204–06, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding employment contract illusory because of
employer’s change-in-terms provision).
170 PERILLO, supra note 69, at § 4.12.
171 U.C.C. § 2-306 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see also id. § 2-311 (discretion to specify particulars of performance must be exercised in good faith). But see Office
Pavilion S. Florida, Inc. v. ASAL Prods., Inc., 849 So. 2d 367, 367–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that a requirements contract lacked consideration, without reference to § 2306 of the U.C.C.).
166
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problem.172 Courts are divided as to whether an employer’s promise of at-will
employment is illusory, and therefore whether employee noncompete promises
are enforceable.173
3. The State of the Law
The illusory promise theory has recently emerged in challenges to arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and noncompete and confidentiality agreements in at-will employment contracts.174 The consumer and employment cases
highlight the fact that unconscionability is a far superior doctrinal solution to
the problem of excessive discretion than the illusory contract doctrine. The
consideration-based illusory contract rule is so easily circumvented that one
wonders why merchants and employers still occasionally fail to overcome it.
Courts may refuse to enforce contracts found to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable, weighing not only the imbalance in the parties’ duties
and obligations, but also their relative bargaining power and the process by
which the contract was negotiated, or adhered to. The employee noncompete
cases discussed below175 also show that public policy approaches, that frankly
assess the fairness of these troublesome contracts, are what is really going on
even when courts invoke an absence of consideration as the reason to deny enforcement. If a purely illusory promise can be “fixed” by requiring some good
faith or notice period in exercising the discretion, it can still be separately evaluated for unconscionability. Among the 186 cases decided in the past three
years classified as consideration cases only two invalidated a contract on the
grounds that one party’s promises were illusory, and both could have been better analyzed as unconscionability or public policy cases.176 Given this, it is unclear what useful work the illusory promise consideration corollary is still doing. In any event, the discussion of the illusory promise concept in contracts
class could better be incorporated in the discussion of unconscionability and
public policy defenses.

172

La Frontera Ctr., Inc. v. United Behavioral Health, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1177–78,
1226 (D.N.M. 2017); Neurodiagnostic Tex, L.L.C. v. Pierce, 506 S.W.3d 153, 159, 163–64
(Tex. Ct. App. 2016).
173 Compare Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 576–78, 584 (5th Cir. 2015)
(holding employee non-compete agreement invalid under Texas law), with Horter Inv.
Mgmt., LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 897, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (continued atwill employment was sufficient consideration to support employee confidentiality agreement
under Ohio law).
174 See infra text accompanying notes 268–78.
175 See infra text accompanying notes 268–78.
176 Hunn, 789 F.3d at 576–78, 584; Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423,
426–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
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F. The Third-Party Guarantee
1. The Problem and Values
A lender seeking additional protection for its loan will often ask officers or
owners of a corporate borrower to provide personal guarantees. The question
whether the guarantors’ promise to pay is supported by consideration has often
masked issues of economic duress or unconscionability.177 In the classic scenario, a corporate owner or officer brings in a spouse who is not involved in the
business as guarantor, and when the business defaults, the spouse is faced with
the perhaps unexpected duty to repay the business loan. In another scenario, a
business about to default or having already defaulted on a loan is required to
obtain personal guarantees in return for forbearance from foreclosure or other
drastic collection action. In both scenarios, the underlying issues are the availability of small business credit on the one hand, and issues of informed assent,
economic duress, and unconscionable overreaching by lenders on the other
hand.
2. Choice of Rules
Consideration doctrine is not particularly helpful in sorting enforceable
guarantees from unenforceable guarantees. In the initial loan guarantee scenario, and in the post-default scenario with forbearance, the lender obviously suffers a detriment (an advance of loan money), so the consideration question is
whether that detriment (loan or forbearance) was induced by the guarantee.
Guarantors seeking to void their promise must attempt to prove that the lender
would have made the loan (or the forbearance or workout) even without the
guarantee.178 Except in the rare case where there is a written loan approval
without the guarantee, and the guarantor is brought in as an afterthought,179 the
absence of inducement is difficult to prove. Courts occasionally still confuse
the issues, focusing on the benefit/detriment aspect, which is not at issue, rather
than the inducement issue.180 The Restatement (Second) section 88 rules for
guarantees depart from consideration, making a guaranty promise enforceable,
similar to firm offers, so long as it is in writing and “recites a purported consideration,” or if the promise induces reasonable and foreseeable reliance.181
177

See United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 594, 598–99 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding wife’s
guarantee unenforceable without reference to possible duress or unconscionability).
178 E.g., Kansas City Live Block 125 Retail, LLC v. Bhakta, 476 S.W.3d 326, 328–30, 332
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding trial court finding that guarantee was required to induce the
loan, and therefore supported by sufficient consideration).
179 See Meadors, 753 F.2d at 597–98.
180 In re Floyd, 540 B.R. 747, 751, 753–54 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015), aff’d sub nom., No.
1:13-bk-02134-TLM, 2016 WL 1733433 (D. Idaho Apr. 29, 2016) (court finds there was
consideration for a post-default guarantee, without addressing whether any new advance or
forbearance was given at the time of the guarantee).
181
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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More importantly, the real issues of duress and overreaching are better addressed by explicitly relying on the defense doctrines (fraud, mistake, unconscionability, duress, undue influence). The gender bias that historically plagued
loan guarantees was addressed to some extent in provisions of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and implementing regulations, which restrict lenders from imposing unnecessary guarantee requirements on spouses.182
3. The State of the Law
The Restatement (Second) provides that third-party guarantees are enforceable without regard to consideration, if they are signed and in writing.183 Our
survey of recent cases did not uncover a single case invalidating a third-party
guaranty for want of consideration.184 Federal law now includes two statutory
rules to protect consumers from improvident guarantees. The Federal Trade
Commission’s 1976 Credit Practices Rule makes it an illegal unfair trade practice to misrepresent the nature or extent of cosigner liability in a consumer
credit transaction.185 The rule requires merchants to provide cosigners with a
specified written disclosure warning the cosigners of their potential liability.186
Regulations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act are also intended to protect guarantors from creditor overreaching, taking aim at a once-common practice that discriminates against female applicants.187 A creditor may not require a
spouse to cosign an extension of credit when the applicant meets the creditor’s
credit standards.188 The subject of third-party guarantees is also extensively
regulated by the law of sureties and U.C.C. Article 3,189 and thus is perhaps
best omitted from introductory contracts law classes.
III. CONSIDERATION IN THE COURTS
A. Many Cases Referring to “Consideration” Did Not Turn on True
Consideration Issues
Although contemporary state and federal court opinions continue to invoke
the doctrine of consideration, the cases often involve issues better analyzed
with other contact law principles, and sometimes reveal that judges may be as
confused as law students about the meaning of consideration. The Westlaw key
182

12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (2019).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
184 Cf. Martin Printing, Inc. v. Sone, 873 A.2d 232, 234, 238–39 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting an argument that guarantee lacked consideration and also applying Restatement
(Second) § 88).
185 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)(1) (2019).
186 Id. § 444.3(c).
187 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d).
188 Id.
189 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SECURITY AND SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (AM. LAW INST.
1996); U.C.C. § 3-419 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
183
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number system includes no fewer than forty-four different topics under the rubric of consideration,190 including all of the corollaries, as well as topics like
“adequacy of consideration” and “failure of consideration”, which as we shall
see, are misnomers for other contract law doctrines (unconscionability and material breach, respectively). A Westlaw search for cases coded by West under
these forty-four different headings in state and federal courts for a recent threeyear period (June 2015 to June 2018) produces citations to a surprising 181
cases.191 On closer examination, however, few if any of these cases turned on
true consideration issues. Although forty cases resulted in denial of enforcement, most of these could have been decided on other grounds, or would have
come out differently had the courts applied Restatement rules.192 One hundred
and sixty-eight of the 181 cases discussing consideration involved business or
commercial exchange transactions, and even the ten family disputes mostly involved either negotiated pre- or post-marital agreements or estate disputes.193
No reported cases resembled the casual, social, or family promises that are the
grist of casebooks and law school classrooms, and that consideration theory is
supposed to help filter out of the judicial system.
B. Cases Denying Enforcement for Want of Consideration Mostly Involve
Indefinite Promises or Consideration Corollaries
Of the forty cases where courts denied enforcement of a promise while invoking consideration, thirty-four involved business transactions, including employment, insurance, loans, and real estate contracts.194 These were promises
that scholars advocating for a commercial exchange test would find enforceable
(setting aside indefiniteness and contract defense issues).195 Four of the forty

190

West Key Number System, 95(I)(D), Nos. 47–91 (accessible through Westlaw.com by
selecting “Key Numbers” under the “Content types” tab, then selecting No. 95 “Contracts”
where subsection “(D) Consideration” can be found).
191 Westlaw search conducted June 11, 2018, all Federal and all state cases, Key numbers 47
to 91, filtered for cases in past 3 years. The search produced 353 headnotes to 181 unique
cases. See Appendix I, on file with author. A similar search for Key numbers 1 to 46 (capacity, offer and acceptance) for the past three years yielded 801 headnotes, and 1,780 headnotes
for all Contracts key number topics. By this rough measure about 20 percent (353/1780) of
contracts headnotes were classified as “consideration” issues by West in state and federal
cases decided in this three-year period.
192 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82–90 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
193 See Appendix I, on file with author.
194 E.g., Cityscapes Dev., LLC v. Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (real
estate); Roller v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 484 S.W.3d 110, 112–13 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)
(insurance). See Appendix I, on file with author.
195 Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 36, at 271; see also Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904–05 (1985); James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283, 286 (1991).
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cases involved family promises196 and two arose in disputes between parents
and schools around their child’s education.197 From this perspective, the gatekeeping function of consideration doctrine appears to be missing the mark.
Of these forty cases denying enforcement, seven denied enforcement of
seemingly gratuitous promises.198 Of the seven gratuitous promise cases, two
raised post-contract issues: a promise to forbear enforcement of a debt,199 and
an insurer’s promise to pay a claim.200 One case involving a gratuitous assignment of contract rights was reversed on appeal.201 Of the remaining four cases,
three were family promises,202 and one found that a school’s individualized education plan was not an enforceable contract.203
The cases not involving gratuitous promises denied enforcement based on
consideration corollaries. Four cases purported to find reciprocal promises illusory.204 Ten were based on the pre-existing duty rule denying effect to postcontract modifications.205 Three cases involved firm offers,206 three turned on
past consideration,207 and one involved a third-party guarantee and release.208

196

Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Idaho 2017); Haines-Marchel v. Wash. State
Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 406 P.3d 1199, 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017); Young v. Young, 808
S.E.2d 631, 642 (W. Va. 2017); Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 293 (Wyo. 2016).
197 Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d 507, 513–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (finding
no real promise and no consideration); SH v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 409 P.3d 1231,
1231–32 (Wyo. 2018) (finding that individualized education program was not a contract).
198 Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 (D. De. 2015), rev’d, 837 F.3d 356 (3d
Cir. 2016); Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Roller,
484 S.W.3d at 114–15; Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404, 414–15 (R.I. 2016); HainesMarchel, 406 P.3d at 1216; SH, 409 P.3d at 1233–34; Willey, 385 P.3d at 301.
199 Orcilla, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 734.
200 Roller, 484 S.W.3d at 113.
201 Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 488.
202 Haines-Marchel, 406 P.3d at 1216; Young, 808 S.E.2d at 642; Willey, 385 P.3d at 293.
203 SH, 409 P.3d at 1233.
204 Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F. 3d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 2015) (employee noncompete unenforceable because employment was at will); DiCosola v. Ryan, 44 N.E.3d 556,
561–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding stock grant unenforceable because officer’s promise of
future services was illusory); Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Mo. 2015)
(describing the issue as unconscionability rather than an illusory promise); Bowers v. Asbury
St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (finding arbitration clause
unenforceable when employer retained unilateral right to modify or terminate); Motormax
Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Knight, 474 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (invalidating arbitration clause for lack of mutuality, citing a Missouri supreme court case).
205 Michael Shane Enters., LLC v. Courtroom Connect Corp., 664 F. App’x. 850, 852–53
(11th Cir. 2016); Barrett-O’Neill v. Lalo, LLC, 171 F. Supp. 3d 725, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2016);
McInnis v. OAG Motorcycle Ventures, Inc., 35 N.E.3d 1076, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); AM
Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 443 (Ind. 2015); Yoches v. City of Dearborn, 904
N.W.2d 887, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied, 911 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. 2018);
Safety Ctr., Inc. v. Stier, 903 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); Barclay Petroleum,
Inc., v. Bailey, 96 N.E.3d 811, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017), appeal allowed, 92 N.E.3d 878
(Ohio 2018), appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed, 123 N.E.3d 947 (Ohio 2018);
Cuspide Props., Ltd. v. Earl Mech. Servs., 53 N.E.3d 818, 830 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Socko
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The remaining cases, while described by courts and coded by West as
denying enforcement based on “consideration,” involved other contract law
rules. Four cases denied enforcement on public policy grounds,209 one referred
to a breach as a failure of consideration,210 and seven found promises too indefinite to enforce.211
Apart from the cases resting on the problematic consideration corollaries,
the remainder either involved seemingly gratuitous promises or were cases
readily explainable without resort to consideration doctrine.
1. Gratuitous Promise Cases
Some promises found to lack consideration were made in the context of
prior bargained-for exchanges. For example, an insurer’s promise to settle a fire
loss claim under an existing insurance contract was found both too indefinite
and unsupported by consideration (in the absence of a release from the policyholder).212 A mortgagee’s promise to postpone a foreclosure sale (arising from
the mortgagor’s default on an existing loan transaction) was found unenforceable for want of consideration.213 Because the homeowners did not allege any
conduct that would amount to detrimental reliance, the promise was also not
enforceable based on promissory estoppel.214 The homeowner and lender alv. Mid-Atlantic Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1278 (Pa. 2015); Eurecat US, Inc. v.
Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 387, 390 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).
206 In re First Phoenix-Weston, LLC, 575 B.R. 828, 847 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017); Young v.
Young, 808 S.E.2d 631, 633, 636 (W. Va. 2017); Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman,
781 S.E.2d 198, 208, 216 (W. Va. 2015).
207 Watkins v. Watkins, 402 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Idaho 2017); Cityscapes Dev., LLC v.
Scheffler, 866 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015); Korff v. Corbett, 65 N.Y.S.3d 498, 502
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
208 New v. T3 Invs. Corp., 55 N.E.3d 870, 878–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
209 Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1043 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2017), appeal denied, 93 N.E.3d 1043 (Ill. 2017); Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v.
Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 961–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); Amerigas Propane, LP v. Coffey, No. 14 CVS 376, 2015 WL 60903207, at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 2015); Wharton Physician Servs, PA v. Signature Gulf Coast Hosp., LP, No. 13-1400437-CV, 2016 WL 192069, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016).
210 Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II, PC, 275 F. Supp. 3d 584, 600
(E.D. Pa. 2017), rev’d sub nom., 935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019).
211 Ingham Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 1, 26 (Fed. Cl. 2016), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 874 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Summerhill, LLC v. City of Meriden,
131 A.3d 1225, 1229 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d
507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Sara v. Saint Joseph Healthcare Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.3d 286,
290–91 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015); Vista Food Exch., Inc. v. BenefitMall, 138 A.D.3d 535, 536
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), vacated
on other grounds, 196 A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018); Andoscia v. Town of N. Smithfield, 159
A.3d 79, 82 (R.I. 2017).
212 Roller v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 484 S.W.3d 110, 113, 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
213 Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
214
Id. at 735.
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ready had an enforceable contract, so this case could have been better analyzed
as involving questions of material breach, waiver and modification. In any
event, the same court found the homeowners adequately alleged that the original mortgage loan was unconscionable, so that they might set aside the foreclosure sale on that basis.215
Of the remaining four gratuitous promise cases, three were family promises216 and one found that a school’s individualized education plan was not an
enforceable contract.217 In a classic “dad-promised-me-the-farm” case, a son’s
claim of a father’s oral promise to convey the family ranch was rejected on
multiple grounds, including the absence of any definite promise, any exchange
of services or detrimental reliance, or any written evidence of a promise.218 The
absence of bargained-for exchange was unnecessary to the result, because the
father had clearly expressed his intention to leave the property to his wife, rather than to his son, in various trust documents.219 It was not only consideration
that was missing, but the promise itself. One family dispute involved an allegedly gratuitous binding option,220 while another held unenforceable a unilateral
promise to relinquish a spouse’s claim to equitable distribution of marital property.221
2. Indefinite Promise Cases
Courts may refer to a lack of consideration when they are simply finding
the absence of any clear and definite promise, applying a basic rule of offer and
acceptance.222 For example, a town was found not to have promised its parttime zoning inspector a two-year employment contract when an appointment
letter referred to a term “expiring” after two years, but the town ordinance said
the position in question would serve at the pleasure of the town administrator.223 The court held the employee failed to demonstrate a bargained-for exchange.224 The court did not explain why a promise to work for two years
would not support a reciprocal promise not to fire the employee without
cause.225 The true shortcoming in the employee’s claim was either a public policy against long-term employment in this position (perhaps to preserve town
215

Id. at 728–29.
Haines-Marchel v. Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 406 P.3d 1199, 1204 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2017); Young v. Young, 808 S.E.2d 631, 633 (W. Va. 2017); Willey v. Willey, 385
P.3d 290, 293 (Wyo. 2016).
217 SH v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 409 P.3d 1231, 1232 (Wyo. 2018).
218 Willey, 385 P.3d at 301.
219 See id. at 295, 302.
220 Young, 808 S.E.2d at 633.
221 Haines-Marchel, 406 P.3d at 1204, 1216.
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 33 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
223 Andoscia v. Town of N. Smithfield, 159 A.3d 79, 80, 82 (R.I. 2017).
224 Id. at 82.
225
See id.
216
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budget flexibility), or simply a failure to prove that a true promise of long-term
employment was even made (the indefinite offer problem).
Another example of an indefinite promise arose in an action by employees
suing their hospital employer for breach of an implied promise to safeguard
personal data lost in a computer data breach. The court held that the employees
did not allege that the hospital ever objectively manifested an intent to enter into a contract, that is, no implied promise was even alleged.226 As a makeweight,
the court added that the employees “did not give their information to [the employer] for the consideration of its safe keeping, but instead, for employment
purposes,” and therefore consideration was lacking.227 This reasoning was both
unnecessary and incorrect. If there had been a clear employer promise to safeguard employee information, it would clearly have been induced by the employee’s work or promise to work. If the result in this case was correct, offer
and acceptance doctrine was fully adequate to reach it.
Similarly, an Illinois court denied enforcement of an alleged implied contract between worker’s compensation insurers and health-care providers relying
on backwards application of consideration doctrine, rather than a straightforward analysis of offer and acceptance and third-party beneficiary doctrine.228
The insurers contracted with employers to pay for the health care of injured
employees.229 The medical provider plaintiffs asserted in the alternative that
they were either third-party beneficiaries of the employer insurance policies or
had an implied contract directly with the insurers.230 Applicable state law required insurers to pay providers promptly and to pay interest on late payments.231 The dispute could properly be viewed as either an attempt to assert a
private right of action under the state law or as a claim to enforce the insured
employees’ claims as third-party beneficiaries. The court rejected the implied
right of action claim and the third-party beneficiary claim for similar reasons,
finding that health care providers were incidental beneficiaries, not intended
beneficiaries, of the worker’s compensation statute and insurance policies.232 In
other words, what was missing was a promise, not a bargained-for exchange.
Turning to the implied-in-fact contract argument, the court reasoned that
because the insurance companies owed a legal duty to pay benefits promptly,
any implied promise to pay benefits promptly would not amount to consideration, invoking the pre-existing duty rule.233 The flaw in the analysis, of course,
226

Dittman v. UPMC 154 A.3d 318, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 196
A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018).
227 Id.
228 Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1044 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2017).
229 Id. at 1033.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 1042–43.
233
Id. at 1044.
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is that the consideration required to enforce the insurance company’s implied
promise would flow from the health care providers, not from the insurance
companies. The health care providers’ claim was that they impliedly promised
(as required by state law) not to bill the employee or the employer in return for
the insurers’ promise to pay promptly, and to pay interest on late payments.234
The providers’ promise to forbear from collecting from workers was the consideration for the insurers’ promise the providers sought to enforce. The true
flaw in the implied contract argument was not the absence of an exchange of
promises, it was the absence of any implied promise, because the court consistently found the insurance companies were promising to pay workers and employers, not medical providers.
Thus, many judges invoke consideration as requisite for promise enforcement, sometimes misapplying the doctrine, but the results in nearly every case
can be fully explained without resort to consideration doctrine.
C. Many Cases Invoke and Apply Consideration Doctrine but Did Not Apply
It (or Misapplied It)
Looking at the broader set of cases discussing consideration doctrine while
not denying enforcement, many (twenty-eight) simply recite consideration as
one of the elements of contract formation, along with offer and acceptance, in
cases not presenting consideration issues.235 Other cases mention consideration
in non-contract disputes, including property,236 criminal law237 and local government law cases.238 Many (nineteen) of the cases involve the enforceability of
covenants not to compete, with rule statements containing some variation of an
element of valuable or reasonable consideration, along with the other reasonableness elements.239 Apart from the noncompete cases, other employment disputes grappled with whether at-will employment or one-sided mandatory arbitration clauses240 involve illusory promises. These are all fundamentally
economic exchanges, so courts are discussing “consideration” when the real
issues are those of public competition policy, unequal bargaining power, economic duress, or unfair terms.241
234

Id.
E.g., Mecum v. Weilert Custom Homes, LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1095 (N.D. Ill.
2017); Bank of Am., NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 878 N.W.2d 816, 830 (Mich. 2016).
236 E.g., Behrens v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 663, 670 (Fed. Cl. 2017).
237 E.g., State v. Villagomez, 412 P.3d 183, 184 (Or. 2018).
238 E.g., EP Hotel Partners, LP v. City of El Paso, 527 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. Ct. App.
2017).
239 See e.g., Fay v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).
240 E.g., Reed v Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 813, 816 (S.D.W. Va. 2016); Shatteen
v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp.,113 F. Supp. 3d 176, 178, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2015).
241 Fay, 799 S.E.2d at 327 (Geathers, J., concurring) (finding employee noncompete agreement invalid as an excessive restraint of trade); Motormax Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Knight, 474
235
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In the following cases, the application of consideration doctrine served no
useful purpose, or confused the application of other recognized contract law
rules concerning formation, defenses, or performance and breach.
Consideration doctrine needlessly confused the issues in a Mississippi
worker’s compensation dispute.242 The employer sought to avoid payment of
benefits on the grounds that the purported employee had not been hired yet.243
The employee was injured during a road test, which was a condition for the offer of a job as truck driver.244 If, as the driver contended, the employer had
promised him a salary and benefits in return for his attending the road test and
then beginning work, there was no true consideration problem. The employer’s
promise to pay salary and benefits (including the legally required worker’s
compensation) was supported by the employee’s reciprocal promise to drive the
employer’s trucks.245 The real issue was whether the employer’s invitation to a
road test was a definite offer subject to a condition, or just an invitation to apply for a job. The language of the employer’s letter, the court found, left no
doubt that there was a definite offer, because if the driver passed the test, he
was hired.246 The court then discussed whether the driver’s participation in the
road test was a benefit to the employer sufficient to provide consideration for
the employer’s promise of a job.247 There are two distinct errors in this analysis. First, a benefit to the promisor is not essential to finding consideration; a
detriment to the promisee will do just as well. Second, a benefit to the promisor
can come in the form of either present performance, or a promise of future performance. In this case, the employee’s implied acceptance of the job offer (by
doing the road test) and his promise of future services obviously constituted
consideration, either as benefit to the employer or detriment to the employee, in
exchange for promised salary and benefits. The time spent by lawyers briefing,
and the court deciding, the non-issue of consideration merely added to the
transaction costs of this case.
Another example of a confused consideration argument involved an employer attempting to evade its own promise to hire noncitizen guest workers
and pay them the legal minimum wage.248 The employer asserted that its legal
obligation to pay the minimum wage was a pre-existing duty that could not

S.W.3d 164, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (invalidating arbitration clause in auto title loan because only consumer was bound).
242 Averitt Exp., Inc. v. Collins, 172 So. 3d 1252, 1254 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1254–55.
245 See id. at 1257.
246 Id. at 1256.
247 Id. at 1257.
248 Cordova v. R&A Oysters, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1290 (S.D. Ala. 2016); Moodie v.
Kiawah Island Inn Co., LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 711, 714 (D.S.C. 2015).
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amount to consideration.249 This argument (rejected by the court,250 fortunately)
made no sense. The promise to be enforced was the employer’s; it was therefore the employees who furnished the consideration needed to enforce the
promise, by working, or promising to work. Here, an appellate court was called
upon to correct the attorneys’ confusion as to whether consideration is something provided by the promisor or the promisee.
The promisor/promisee confusion arose in another employment dispute,
involving employees suing an employer for failure to protect their personal data
from a data breach.251 The court found there was no implied promise by the
employer, but also found, weirdly, that the employees’ act of providing personal data was not induced by any employer promise to safeguard the data.252 Of
course, the promise to be enforced was the employer’s, so if there was a consideration issue, it would be whether the promise to safeguard data was induced
by either the employees’ services generally, or the employees’ act of providing
personal data specifically.253 The heart of this emerging and important issue is
whether protection of personal data should be an implied term in every employment contract, better analyzed either as a public policy issue or a negligence/duty issue.
Thus, in many instances it would be simpler for courts to address directly
whether the parties actually offered and accepted an exchange of promises, or
promises for performances, rather than couching formation analysis in the language of consideration and confusing the analysis in the process.254
D. Cases Describing Material Breach as a “Failure of Consideration”
Unnecessary confusion also results from using consideration terminology
to describe rules having nothing to do with contract identification or formation.
For example, courts will refer to a material breach as a “failure of consideration,” excusing the other party’s performance.255 Other courts may refer to the
failure of a condition as a violation of the mutuality required for consideration.
Of course, in these cases the original exchange of promises was fully supported
by consideration on both sides. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court
249

Cordova, 169 F. Supp. at 1292; see also Moodie, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 727 (rejecting similar bizarre employer argument that legal duty to pay minimum wage is a pre-existing duty
vitiating consideration for promise to pay wages).
250 Cordova, 169 F. Supp. at 1292; see also Moodie, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 727.
251 Dittman v UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 196
A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018).
252 Id. at 326.
253 See id. at 321.
254 See Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 N.E.3d 507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding that student handbook was not a contract between high school and student and absent
any student promises there was no consideration); New v. T3 Investments Corp., 55 N.E. 3d
870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
255 Altercare of Mayfield Vill., Inc. v. Berner, 86 N.E.3d 649, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017);
KIT Projects, LLC v. PLT P’ship, 479 S.W.3d 519, 527 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).
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found that a promise not to sue for breach of a prior contract, given in exchange
for a promised payment, was not enforceable because timely payment was an
express condition of the release of the breach of contract claim.256 Although the
court described this holding as based on the rule that promises must be enforceable to constitute consideration, there was obviously no consideration problem
with the original settlement agreement: the plaintiff promised not to sue and the
defendant promised to pay a sum of money.257 The reference to mutuality of
promises, duly coded by West as a consideration holding, was in fact a holding
based on the rule that the failure of an express condition excuses the reciprocal
promise. Modern courts would do better to dispense with the reference to consideration when applying the rules of conditions, performance, and breach.
E. Cases Referring to “Adequacy of Consideration” When Applying
Unconscionability Analysis, or When Refusing to Judge the Fairness of a
Bargain
One set of cases invoke the rule that courts will not judge the adequacy of
consideration, or in other words, the fairness of the contractual exchange, except when a party establishes an accepted enforceability defense, such as fraud,
unconscionability, or duress.258 In the context of one-sided bargains, consideration doctrine achieves little except to bias courts against applying enforceability
defenses intended to curb abuses of bargaining power.
Mandatory arbitration clauses are often challenged as unconscionable or
violating some public policy, using the language of consideration.259 For example, a patient sought to avoid an arbitration clause inserted in an invoice for
medical records, and to dispute the reasonableness of the medical records provider’s fee.260 The court found the arbitration clause unenforceable for lack of
consideration, on the grounds that a statute entitled the patient to obtain the
records for a “reasonable, cost-based fee” and thus created a pre-existing duty
that could not constitute consideration for the patient’s promise to arbitrate disputes.261 The court was really saying that the statute’s regulation of the contract
content not only barred unreasonable fees, but also any other condition or
promise imposed on the patient.262 In other words, public policy essentially
barred the inclusion of an arbitration agreement.

256

Cherry v. Pinson Termite & Pest Control, LLC, 206 So. 3d 557, 565–66 (Ala. 2016).
See id. at 560.
258 159 MP Corp. v Redbridge Bedford, LLC, 71 N.Y.S.3d 87, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
259 See, e.g., Hudson v. BAH Shoney’s Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 661, 668–71 (M.D. Tenn.
2017) (finding restaurant employee’s arbitration agreement unenforceable as not a knowing
and voluntary waiver of jury trial, although consideration was present).
260 Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v. Med. Records Online, Inc., 136 A.3d 955, 958 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
261 Id. at 959–61.
262
Id. at 962.
257
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Similarly, an employee successfully challenged an arbitration provision in
an initial employment contract because the employer had the right to unilaterally change all terms of the agreement, rendering the employers’ promises illusory.263 Here again, the court invoked consideration doctrine to undo an arbitration agreement, when the true basis for the decision was unconscionability
(extreme one-sidedness) rather than absence of a bargained-for exchange.
A federal judge in New Mexico found an employer’s post-employment arbitration program enforceable because the employee’s continued employment
under new ownership constituted sufficient consideration for the change in employment terms.264 The court, rather unconvincingly, distinguished New Mexico state court decisions finding that continued at-will employment is not a legal
detriment to the employer and therefore not sufficient consideration to support
a post-hiring arbitration clause.265
Another case in which one suspects the court found a one-sided bargain unjust, and misapplied consideration doctrine, involved three promoters of a tobe-formed corporation, one of whom promised to provide all the capital ($1
million) while the other two promised to perform as managers, with the managers each receiving 45 percent and the investor receiving 10 percent of the
shares.266 Clearly, the mutual promises (to allocate shares in the new venture)
were a form of consideration that each gave the other. Nevertheless, the Illinois
court found the future managers’ promise illusory, and denied enforcement of
the investor’s promise of $1 million.267 The real problem with this business
transaction was not an absence of mutual exchange, but the court’s apparent
perception that the exchange was extremely lopsided. Unconscionability doctrine is better suited to evaluate such claims.
F. Cases Referring to Presence or Adequacy of Consideration When
Evaluating the Reasonableness of Covenants Not to Compete as a Matter
of Public Policy
Consideration language appears frequently in employment cases revolving
around the enforceability of non-compete agreements.268 In these cases the usual issue is either the public policy enforceability defense that disfavors enforcing unreasonable restraints on trade, or a problem of a post-contract modification when an employer adds a non-compete agreement to an existing

263

Bowers v. Asbury St. Louis Lex, LLC, 478 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
Laurich v. Red Lobster Rests., LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1217–18 (D.N.M. 2017).
265 Id. at 1217 (citing Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 14 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004)
and Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.N.M. 2001)).
266 DiCosola v. Ryan, 44 N.E.3d 556, 560–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
267 Id. at 562.
268 E.g., Horter Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017);
Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1275 (Pa. 2015); Eurecat U.S., Inc. v.
Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 387–88 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).
264
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employment contract.269 When courts identify consideration as an element for
the enforceability of a non-compete agreement as part of an initial employment
contract, consideration adds nothing to the analysis. The employee gets a promise of a salary in exchange for services provided and the promise not to compete after termination.270 These are essentially “incantation” cases, when the
consideration element is superfluous and the real analysis is reasonableness of,
and hence the willingness of courts to enforce, an agreement in restraint of
trade. Some courts have held that at-will employment is essentially an illusory
promise, and therefore fails as consideration for an employee promise not to
compete.271 The existence or adequacy of consideration is sometimes invoked
as a test of whether a restrictive covenant should be enforced,272 but what is really going on in these cases is an evaluation of the reasonableness of a restraint
of trade.
When the issue presented is whether to enforce a covenant not to compete
obtained by an employer after the initial employment contract was made, the
court is faced with a post-contract modification issue, where consideration doctrine masks the real issues.273 Courts are not consistent in treatment of these
“afterthought agreement” cases.274 For example, when an employee signed a
modified confidentiality agreement eleven years after his initial employment
(when he had signed an earlier version of the confidentiality promise) the Texas
Appeals Court found the modified confidentiality agreement unenforceable for
lack of consideration.275 The court held that a promise of continued employment was illusory because the employment was at-will.276 That reasoning, of
course, would prevent any modification of an ongoing employment contract by
the employer, regardless of changes in circumstances, at least in the absence of
a cash payment, salary increase, or other new promise by the employer. An
Ohio court, on the other hand, found that a promise of continued at-will em269

See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consideration:
A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L. REV.
409, 412–17 (2015).
270 Some state courts have ruled that at-will employment is consideration for an employee’s
promise not to compete. Horter Inv. Mgmt., 257 F. Supp. 3d at 902; Metalico Pittsburgh Inc.
v. Newman, 160 A.3d 205, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). While others hold that at-will employment is not consideration. Boswell v Panera Bread Co., 879 F.3d 296, 301 (8th Cir.
2018) (applying Missouri law).
271 Boswell, 879 F.3d at 301.
272 E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gemma, 301 F. Supp. 3d 523, 534 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (applying Pennsylvania law); Brinton Bus. Ventures, Inc. v. Searle, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1035–36
(D. Or. 2017) (applying Oregon law); ATC Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. RCM Techs., Inc., 192
F. Supp. 3d 943, 960 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (applying Illinois law).
273 See supra text accompanying notes 72–126.
274 Alph C. Kaufman, Inc. v. Cornerstone Indus. Corp., 540 S.W.3d 803, 814 (Ky. Ct. App.
2017); Amerigas Propane, LP v. Coffey, No. 14 CVS 376, 2015 WL 6093207, at *9 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2015).
275 Eurecat U.S., Inc. v. Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 388–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017); accord
Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 2015).
276
Eurecat U.S., Inc., 527 S.W.3d at 389.
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ployment would be consideration for a post-hire non-compete agreement.277
This area of the law could be made more coherent by abandoning references to
consideration and instead evaluating issues of economic duress and the reasonableness of particular non-compete arrangements, balancing the employee’s
ability to earn a living with legitimate employer interests.
The irony of the covenant not to compete cases and the mandatory arbitration cases is that consideration language is used to do precisely what consideration doctrine eschews, namely to evaluate the fairness of a contractual exchange.278
This survey of contemporary case law confirms the observation that the
core consideration principle, that a promise not supported by a bargained-for
exchange is not enforceable, is often recited, often invoked mistakenly when
other contract rules are at issue, frequently misunderstood or misapplied, and
does little or no independent work to filter out promises not meriting judicial
enforcement.
IV. THE CONSIDERATION-FREE CONTRACTS LAW SYLLABUS
To begin with, we should abandon the archaic usage of the word “consideration” to refer to the bargained-for exchange, and allow it to join assumpsit,
chattel mortgage, and trespass on the case in the museum of disused legal
terms. To teach contemporary contract law, the more familiar terms “bargain
theory” or “exchange theory” will serve just as well. Legal historians may wish
to recount the origins of the term “consideration” in the common law and the
writings of Holmes, Williston and Langdell, perhaps comparing it with its civil
law cousin “causa.”279
More importantly, the syllabus should be organized around the most common problems contract rules must solve. The problem of donative promises
does not merit the central role that the traditional syllabus allots it. Let us bid
farewell to Hamer v. Sidway280 and Dougherty v Salt.281 The need to discuss
bargain theory, in conjunction with reliance and other alternatives, will arise at
various points throughout the syllabus, and may be taken up in the context of
each discrete contracting problem. For example, non-exchange promises (donative promises, promises recognizing past benefits, and reaffirmations) may be
covered as a group to introduce reliance and restitution. Bargain theory, reli277

Horter Inv. Mgmt,. LLC v. Cutter, 257 F. Supp. 3d 892, 901–02 (S.D. Ohio 2017).
See Moezinia v. Ashkenazi, 26 N.Y.S.3d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (noting that
courts do not inquire into the adequacy or fairness of consideration exchanged).
279 Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-Border Commercial Contracts and Consideration, 34 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 1, 11 (2016); see generally GILMORE, supra note 1.
280 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) (holding uncle’s promise of money enforceable based on the consideration of nephew’s promise to refrain from drinking, smoking,
swearing or gambling).
281 Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94–95 (N.Y. 1919) (holding aunt’s written promissory
note to nephew unenforceable for want of consideration).
278
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ance, and restitution will be discussed in presenting the alternative theories of
remedies; indeed, this is an argument for beginning the contracts syllabus with
remedies.
Contracts law professors commonly use one of two structures for their syllabi, with, of course, many variations. Some begin with contract remedies, then
follow with the topics of formation, defenses, interpretation, performance, and
breach. Others begin with contract formation, and save remedies for the end,
following a chronological sequence in the life of a contract dispute. The core of
bargain theory, consideration, is usually covered as part of the contract formation topic, along with offer and acceptance, and perhaps capacity. The consideration corollaries are sometimes included in the formation chapter, and
sometimes covered later, particularly in the case of the pre-existing duty rule
and contract modifications.
It is also customary to present consideration doctrine in three steps.282 First,
casebooks present a case applying the “traditional” consideration-based rule.283
Students will then read a contrasting case either rejecting consideration or applying some exception284. Finally, the Restatement or U.C.C. approach to the
issue will be presented.285 Students are then left wondering what the “rule” actually is.
I advocate a simpler approach. The contract formation topic, whether at the
beginning of the syllabus or after remedies, ought to cover the rules for discerning a sufficiently definite offer and a timely and clear acceptance. The formation topic may also include the need for a writing under the statute of frauds.
Once that is accomplished, the professor may consider the exceptional question
of unenforceable promises: are there any clear promises, although properly and
timely accepted, that the law nevertheless ought not to enforce? In lieu of “consideration” as the answer to the question, the professor (and casebook) may
cover the alternative and complementary bases for enforcing promises: the bargained-for exchange, the promise recognizing past obligations, or promises inducing reasonable and foreseeable reliance. This is essentially what Restatement (Second) section 17(2) instructs. Neither the case law nor contemporary
theory would justify giving primacy to the bargained-for exchange. The topic
of restitution may usefully be presented at this point.
After presenting examples of promises enforced on each of these three bases, the class might take a brief detour to consider examples of unserious or
otherwise unreasonable-to-rely-on promises that courts have properly refused
to enforce.286 These examples are sufficiently rare that one need not detain the
282

Maggs, supra note 114, at 508 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995)).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 The classics of the genre include Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2000), and Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516,
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class too long for this discussion of the outer limits of contract. Most useful examples are cases in which the promise was insufficiently serious or definite, so
that courts could just as well have relied on offer and acceptance rules to deny
enforcement.287 The issue of enforcing donative promises, including charitable
subscriptions, merits fuller discussion; it should include formality, reliance, and
the bargained-for exchange as alternative rules, and describe the present state of
the law as looking primarily to reliance as the touchstone for enforcement.288
As for the doctrinal corollaries to consideration, each can be taken up at the
appropriate point in the syllabus. The revocability of firm offers is an issue
about the termination of offers, appropriately discussed under the rubric of offer and acceptance. Modification can be discussed with other post-formation
issues, including impracticability, waiver, and breach. So-called illusory promises and absence of mutuality fit better in discussions of the duty of good faith,
unconscionability, and other enforceability defenses. Third-party guarantees are
a separate topic, perhaps to accompany assignment, delegation, and third-party
beneficiaries, if those are even covered in a basic contract law class.
Certainly, a conscientious professor ought to acknowledge the persistence
of historical consideration doctrine in court decisions, when taking up each of
these discrete problems. But one ought also to give prominent place to the
modern trend, reflected in the Restatement (Second) and the Uniform Commercial Code, which is to replace consideration doctrine, or at least to riddle it with
exceptions, at the formation stage and with respect to each of the corollaries.
For each problem, the three steps289 ought to be reversed, presenting first the
modern approach taken by the Restatement (Second) and the U.C.C., followed
by cases adopting the modern approach, and relegating to the third step cases
stubbornly adhering to the historical consideration approach.
So, for example, the law of contract modification requires the professor to
confront the divided case law. However, there is no reason to begin with the old
“pre-existing duty” rule, nor does it make any sense to teach contract modification in a chapter on initial contract formation. One could, and I would argue
ought to, begin by presenting the problem, with an old case like Alaska Packers290 or a contemporary case like Angel v. Murray.291 If the U.C.C. and Restatement approaches are the modern and better trend, teach those first. Casebooks often present two cases to illustrate two opposing rules to resolve an
issue. The pre-existing duty rule can be explained as a relic of classic contract
522 (Va. 1954). For a recent case, see Willey v. Willey, 385 P.3d 290, 301 (Wyo. 2016) (father’s promise to leave son the family ranch too indefinite and not relied upon).
287 E.g., Willey, 385 P.3d at 301.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 50–58.
289 See Maggs, supra note 114, at 509.
290 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (refusing to enforce
employer’s promise to increase wages originally promised to sailors, for want of consideration).
291 Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636, 638 (R.I. 1974) (adopting Restatement section 89
and enforcing a contract modification based on changed circumstances).
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theory, which attempts but fails to protect contracting parties from economic
duress or abuse of leverage in the contract relationship.
Leading casebooks take a variety of approaches to the pre-existing duty
rule and modifications.292 Professor Calamari includes the topic in a second
chapter devoted to consideration, following the first chapter on offer and acceptance.293 A case relying on the pre-existing duty rule is followed by Angel v.
Murray, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision adopting Restatement section 89.294 Professor Barnett also includes modification cases in a chapter on
consideration, but notes that the pre-existing duty rule has been heavily criticized, and abandoned by the U.C.C.295 Professor Ayres similarly includes contract modifications in the formation chapter on consideration, while also noting
that the traditional rule is one of the most criticized in the common law.296 Professor Farnsworth and colleagues, who appear to take a more skeptical view of
the pre-existing duty rule, cover it in a chapter on duress as an enforceability
defense.297 Professor Knapp and colleagues discuss modification in a chapter
on excuses for nonperformance, including mistake, impracticability and modification, telling the student that consideration is one of a number of doctrines
that may be brought to bear on the post-contract modification problem.298
These latter two are clearly better approaches.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of consideration and its corollaries are outmoded rules whose
persistence in the classroom and the courtroom have long ago outlived their
usefulness in resolving a discrete set of contract problems. Each of these problems, the charitable pledge or donative promise, the post-contract modification,
the firm offer, the illusory promise, the promise to compensate past services
and the third-party guarantee, deserves its separate place in the contracts class
syllabus. Each can be presented as a problem with different legal solutions that
may advance values of autonomy, utilitarian wealth maximization, moral obligation or equity. Each problem can be shown to have a historic and formalistic
rule derived from bargain theory and a number of modern alternatives. In the
fifty years that have elapsed since the Second Restatement, consideration doctrine has lost its descriptive and normative powers, and as this survey of contemporary cases shows, confused new generations of lawyers and judges. The
time has come to retire this doctrinal relic in our teaching of contracts law.
292

See Maggs, supra note 114, at 509.
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